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NOTES
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney: A Policy
Decision
In this casenote the author critically examines the recent
decision of Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, in which the Su-
preme Court of the United States advanced a two-part test to
probe for a discriminatory intent behind a facially gender-neutral
state law. The author sets this decision in the context of other
equal protection cases and concludes that this case reflects a
policy decision by the Court not to sustain equal protection chal-
lenges to facially gender-neutral laws unless the legislature has
unequivocally expressed an invidious intent to discriminate.
Helen B. Feeney had worked for the Commonwealth of Massa-
chusetts as a senior clerk stenographer for twelve years before her
job was eliminated in 1975.' During her employment, she had
passed several civil service examinations with scores which would
have earned her a place on the certified list of eligible candidates
for more attractive positions,2 had it not been for the Massachusetts
Veterans' Preference Law.' Because she was not a veteran, Ms. Fee-
1. Personnel, Adm'r v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2288 (1979).
2. Civil service positions in Massachusetts fall into two general categories,
labor and official. For jobs in the official service, with which the proofs in this
action were concerned, the preference mechanics are uncomplicated. All appli-
cants for employment must take competitive examinations. Grades are based on
a formula that gives weight both to objective test results and to training and
experience. Candidates who pass are then ranked in the order of their respective
scores on an "eligible list." Ch. 31, § 23 requires, however, that disabled veterans,
veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans be ranked-in
the order of their respective scores-above all other candidates.
Rank on the eligible list and availability for employment are the sole factors
that determine which candidates are considered for appointment to an official
civil service position. When a public agency has a vacancy, it requisitions a list
of "certified eligibles" from the state personnel division. Under formulas pre-
scribed by civil service rules, a small number of candidates from the top of an
appropriate list, three if there is only one vacancy, are certified. The appointing
agency is then required to choose from among these candidates.
Id. at 2287-88 (footnotes omitted).
3. The names of persons who pass examinations for appointment to any position
classified under the civil service shall be placed upon the eligible lists in the
following order:-
(1) Disabled veterans . . . in the order of their respective standing; (2)
veterans in the order of their respective standing; (3) persons described in section
twenty-three B [the widow or widowed mother of a veteran killed in action or who
died from a service-connected disability incurred in wartime service and who has
not remarried) in the order of their respective standing; (4) other applicants in
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ney was superseded by veterans with lower scores, as mandated by
the absolute preference scheme of the statute.4 Faced with the
practical impossibility of obtaining advancement within the civil
service, she brought an action challenging the constitutionality of
the statute. 5 She claimed that the absolute preference formula inev-
itably operated to deny women the best civil service jobs, contrary
to the guarantee of equal protection of the laws .provided by the
fourteenth amendment.' The three-judge district court found that
the statute was enacted for the legitimate objective of aiding veter-
ans and not for the purpose of discriminating against women.7 Nev-
ertheless, the court held that the drastic impact of the absolute
preference scheme on the ability of women to compete for attractive
civil service positions rendered the law unconstitutional.8 The court
enjoined its further operation. On appeal,' the Supreme Court of the
the order of their respective standing. Upon receipt of a requisition, names shall
be certified from such lists according to the method of certification prescribed by
the civil service rules. A disabled veteran shall be retained in employment in
preference to all other persons, including veterans.
1954 Mass. Acts ch. 627, § 5 (codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 23 (West 1966)), as
amended by 1971 Mass. Acts chs. 219, 1051, § 1 (current version at MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979)).
The Court based its opinion on the language quoted above, which was in effect when this
action commenced. The current statute temporarily suspends the absolute preference system
and instead provides for a point preference system. 1976 Mass. Acts ch. 200, as amended by
1978 Mass. Acts ch. 393, §§ 41, 42 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31, § 26 (West
1979)).
Deferred application of the enjoined absolute preference law would have defeated the
purpose of the Massachusetts Legislature; however, the amendment allowed that state to
continue providing employment benefits to veterans under the point preference system pre-
viously upheld against gender-based challenges. See note 9 infra.
4. On at least two occasions Ms. Feeney's scores on the competitive examinations would
have earned her a place on the "certified eligible" list, had there been no veterans' preference
law. She scored second highest on an examination for a position with the Board of Dental
Examiners and third highest on an examination for an administrative assistant's position.
Each time, men displaced her from the list of applicants certified as eligible because of the
absolute preference for veterans. Only the top three applicants could be certified for a single
vacancy. See note 1 supra. On the list for the administrative assistant position, the preference
system placed Ms. Feeney fourteenth, behind 12 male veterans, 11 of whom had lower test
scores, thus precluding her from certification; similarly, the absolute preference placed her
sixth, behind five male veterans, on the list for a position with the Board of Dental Examin-
ers. 99 S. Ct. at 2288.
5. She brought the suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 99 S. Ct. at 2285. A claim under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was apparently foregone because one section of the
Act provides that Title VII does not repeal or modify any laws which grant special preference
to veterans. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-11 (1970).
6. 99 S. Ct. at 2285-86.
7. Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 495 (D. Mass. 1976).
8. Id. at 497-99.
9. Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1977). A direct appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which provides for such appeals where
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United States vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of the intervening decision in Washington v. Davis'"
that "a neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause
solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact; in-
stead, the disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to
discriminate on the basis of race.""
On remand, the three-judge district court found that Davis did
not require reversal of the prior decision.' 2 The court held that since
the dramatically uneven impact on women caused by the statute
was foreseeable and inevitable, the legislature could be said to have
intended the discriminatory effect to occur. 3 Applying the Davis
standard, the court held that this inference of discriminatory intent
rendered the statute violative of the equal protection clause. On
appeal," the Supreme Court of the United States held, reversed:
The challenger of the veterans' preference law had failed to prove
that a discriminatory intent had in any way motivated the enact-
ment of this law, despite its foreseeably severe and inevitable im-
pact on the job opportunities of women in the civil service, and
despite the availability of less drastic means of preference to the
state legislature, because other historical and circumstantial evi-
dence suggested that the preference promoted a legitimate interest
in benefiting veterans, did not overtly classify on the basis of gender
and was not enacted for the purpose of discriminating against
women. Without proof of discriminatory intent, the law could not
be held to *violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282
(1979).
Considered narrowly, the Feeney case is the latest addition to
a long line of decisions upholding the constitutionality of state stat-
utes granting veterans preferential treatment in civil employment, 5
with the distinguishing feature of gender discrimination as the
grounds for attack. 6 Previously, only males had brought to the Su-
the case was required to be heard initially by a three-judge district court.
10. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2286.
12. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143 (D. Mass. 1978).
13. Id' at 149-50.
14. The appeal was taken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
15. For an overview and history of constitutional challenges to laws creating veterans'
preferences, see Blumberg, De Facto and De Jure Sex Discrimination Under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause: A Reconsideration of the Veterans' Preference in Public Employment, 26
BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 13-17 (1976-77).
16. Before Feeney, the Supreme Court had never considered such a challenge. For cases
brought on similar grounds in lower courts, see Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D.
19801
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
preme Court such challenges to veterans' preference laws. In each
case the Court affirmed the application by the lower courts of a
rational basis test to the male's equal protection challenge to the
statutory classification between veterans and nonveterans.'7 To es-
tablish an equal protection claim under such an analysis, the plain-
tiff has the burden of proving that the law has a discriminatory
purpose, unless the law either uses a "suspect" classification 8 or
burdens a "fundamental right,"" in which case the Court carefully
scrutinizes the law and requires the state to show that the law is
closely related to a "compelling state interest" and is narrowly
drawn to avoid unnecessary discrimination. In veterans' preference
laws, the classification between veterans and nonveterans is not
suspect, and the right to public employment is not fundamental. In
the typical challenge by a male nonveteran, then, the court tests the
law only for a rational basis, requiring the plaintiff to prove either
that the legislature had an impermissible purpose or that the means
employed had no rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. 2'
Courts have traditionally recognized three possible motives of legis-
latures desiring to aid or reward veterans,2 1 and granting them pref-
erence in hiring for state jobs clearly advances that desire. Thus,
under this rational basis test, the male challenger always loses.
In Feeney, because Ms. Feeney claimed that the Massachusetts
law discriminated against her on the basis of sex, the Court sub-
jected the statute to an intermediate level of scrutiny, departing
Ill. 1976) (sustaining a point preference statute); Feinerman v. Jones, 356 F. Supp. 252 (M.D.
Pa. 1973) (sustaining a point preference scheme); Ballou v. State, 148 N.J. Super. 112, 372
A.2d 333 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), aff'd, 75 N.J. 365, 382 A.2d 1118 (1978) (upholding an
absolute preference scheme in hiring and promotion).
17. See, e.g., Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1974); August v. Bronstein, 369 F.
Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974); Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp 243
(D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 976 (1973).
18. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race).
19. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
20. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F. Supp. 243, 251 (D. Minn. 1972), aff'd mem., 410 U.S.
976 (1973). The rational basis test demands no inquiry into actual motive, the value of
legislative objectives, or the fairness of the means employed. Even if the means employed is
grossly unfair, courts do "not ordinarily sit to evaluate the wisdom of particular statutory
means; that task is assigned to others in our system of government." Rios v. Dillman, 499
F.2d 329, 332 (5th Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original); see L. TIBE, AMERICAN CoNsrrtIMONAL
LAw 995 (1978).
21. The three motives are: (1) The state owes a debt of gratitude to veterans; (2) a
veteran is likely to possess the qualities of courage and fidelity, valuable in public office; and
(3) veterans should be aided in readjusting to normal society. Koelgfen, 355 F. Supp. at 251.
Cf. Rios v. Dillman, 499 F.2d at 333 (adding encouragement of enlistment as a proper objec-
tive).
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significantly from the rational basis test applicable in the male
challenges." The Court did not characterize gender as a suspect
classification" but did note that gender has "traditionally been the
touchstone for pervasive and often subtle discrimination,"'" and
therefore classifications based on gender must have "an exceedingly
persuasive justification" based upon "a 'close and substantial rela-
tionship to important governmental objectives.' "25 This test applies
even though the statute concededly 2l is gender-neutral on its face,
if the apparent neutrality of the classification is a mere pretext
masking a discriminatory purpose." To determine whether a fa-
cially gender-neutral law violates the equal protection clause, a
court must conduct a "two-fold inquiry":
The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed
neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based. If the classifica-
tion itself, covert of [sic] overt, is not based upon gender, the
second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious
gender-based discrimination. . . .In this second inquiry, impact
provides an "important starting point," . . . but purposeful dis-
crimination is "the condition that offends the Constitution."'
22. On the other hand, the Court adopted certain premises from the male-initiated cases:
The facial neutrality of the veteran-nonveteran classification, 99 S. Ct. at 2294; the legitimacy
of a legislative objective to prefer veterans, id.; and the various justifications for governmental
preference of veterans, id. at 2288, 2300.
23. Contrast Justice Stewart's position with that of Justice Brennan's plurality opinion
in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973): "At the outset, appellants contend that
classification based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national
origin, are inherently suspect and must therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny. We
agree . . . ."Id. at 682 (footnotes omitted). For other cases dealing with gender-based chal-
lenges, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
24. 99 S. Ct. at 2293.
25. Id. (purporting to quote from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).
26. 99 S. Ct. at 2293.
27. Id. at 2292-93.
28. Id. at 2293 (citations omitted).
In the concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, is apparently correct
in stating that the distinction between question one and question two is only that between
overt discriminatory classification and covert intent to discriminate. The Court answers the
challenger's claim that the discriminatory impact on women is so obvious as to make the
statute in effect an overt classification by pointing to the neutral definition of veterans and
the fact that the disadvantaged class, nonveterans, includes large numbers of males. Id. at
2294. The real issue thus became the second question, because "even if a neutral law has a
disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose." Id.
at 2292-93. The Court reasoned that the statute's discriminatory impact alone "would signal
that the real classification made by the law was in fact not neutral," in the absence of a
satisfactory explanation for the discrimination, but that "this is not a law that can plausibly
be explained only as a gender-based classification. Indeed, it is not a law that can rationally
be explained on that ground." Id. at 2294 (emphasis added). The Court concluded that, at a
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Prior equal protection cases not involving veterans' preference
laws provide a context that illuminates the significance of this two-
part test and its application in Feeney. These "impact" cases deal
with the problem of inferring an intent to discriminate from the
adverse impact of facially neutral laws on protected minorities.
From these cases emerge two approaches2' to allocating the burden
of proof required under the intermediate level of scrutiny. 0 The
earlier cases emphasize the challenger's burden of establishing an
intent to discriminate." Thus, where competing inferences can be
drawn from the evidence, the complaining party must show that the
greater weight of the evidence requires his inference be drawn, for
that inference of intent to be persuasive. 2 Later impact cases, how-
ever, hold that "[o]nce a prima facie case of invidious discrimina-
tion is established, the burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut
the presumption of unconstitutional action by showing that permis-
minimum, the challenger must show that "a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at
least in some measure, shaped the . . . legislation." Id. (emphasis added).
29. A few cases analyzed challenged decisions solely on the basis of impact, apparently
because of the difficulty of ascertaining legislative motive and the belief that it would be futile
to overturn a law that the legislature could reenact for a "proper" motive. Brest, Palmer v.
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup.
CT. REv. 95, 98, 101-02; see Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976), overruled this approach.
Other cases borrowed as a constitutional standard the holdings of Title VII cases such
as Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), that impact alone was sufficient to trigger
a strict scrutiny analysis. In Davis, the district court, 348 F. Supp. 15 (D.D.C. 1972), and
the court of appeals, 512 F.2d 956, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1975), followed such an analysis, but it was
rejected by the Supreme Court. 426 U.S. at 238-42; see Blumberg, supra note 15, at 21-35.
30. Discovering the actual motives of the legislature goes far beyond the demands of the
rational basis test for an imaginable motive, but is less demanding than a strict scrutiny
analysis: "[A] growing range of cases, involving classifications other than gender and involv-
ing a number of important but not 'constitutionally fundamental' interests, have likewise
triggered forms of review poised between the largely toothless invocation of minimum ration-
ality and the nearly fatal invocation of strict scrutiny-intermediate forms of review ....
L. TRiBE, AMERICAN CoNs'rru'rrONAL LAW 1082 (1978). For further discussion of intermediate
levels of review, see id. at 1082-92.
31. E.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 400 (1945). Akins involved a challenge to the
selection of grand jurors as covertly discriminatory on the basis of race. The Court required
proof of discrimination by showing "systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed
race or by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimina-
tion." Id. at 403-04 (emphasis added).
32. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 57 (1964). In upholding a congressional apportion-
ment statute neutral on its face, the Court reasoned that "[ilt may be true . . . that there
was evidence which could have supported inferences that racial considerations might have
moved the state legislature, but, even if so, we agree that there also was evidence to support
[the] finding that the contrary inference was 'equally, or more, persuasive.' " Id. at 56-57.
Cf. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590-96 (1934) (definite testimony as to the actual
qualifications of specified individual Negroes, which was not met by any testimony equally
direct, showed that there were Negroes in Jackson County qualified for jury service).
[Vol. 34:343
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sible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have pro-
duced the monochromatic result."
The impact cases also delineate the factors that determine
whether an inference of discriminatory intent behind a facially neu-
tral law is appropriate. The uneven impact of the challenged law
often establishes a prima facie case, leading to a deeper examination
of intent. This "impact trigger" appears in election apportionment
cases such as Wright v. Rockefeller, 3, where uneven racial distribu-
tion among districts prompted the scrutiny of actual legislative in-
tent.35 Another primary factor is a prior history of discrimination,
especially in school desegregation cases. In Griffin v. County School
Board,3 repeated and systematic past attempts to avoid the inte-
gration of schools led the Court to conclude that a state law closing
the schools of one county did not operate on all persons equally but
was intended solely to deny blacks integrated public education. On
the other hand, circumstantial evidence in Akins v. Texas3 showed
that the selection of a grand jury was not influenced improperly by
race. In that decision the Court cited the actual events in the selec-
tion process, the judge's instructions and even individual testimony,
in refusing to draw an inference of discriminatory intent. Finally,
the foreseeability or inevitability of a discriminatory result may
require an inference of discriminatory intent. In Goss v. Board of
Education,38 a school desegregation case, the Court held that "no
official transfer plan or provision of which racial segregation is the
inevitable consequence may stand under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' 3' The weight the Court gives to any one of these factors
depends on the facts of each case, but impact, history, circumstan-
tial evidence and foreseeability of result have all been significant in
33. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 631-32 (1972) (citing Turner v. Fouche, 396
U.S. 346, 361 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587 (1958)); see Keyes v. School
District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (burden was shifted to a school board to prove that other
citywide schools were not deliberately segregated after a finding of segregation in one com-
munity).
34. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
35. Impact can be a decisive factor in the final determination of intent as well. In
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960), the effect of a redistricting statute that
created an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" virtually eliminating blacks from the district,
proved conclusive as to discriminatory intent. Racial discrimination was held to be the only
possible motive which could adequately explain the apportionment. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886), arbitrary denial of licenses to Chinese could only be explained as diocrim-
ination. These two cases are alone in relying almost entirely on impact to prove intent. See
Brest, supra note 29, at 100.
36. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
37. 325 U.S. 398 (1945).
38. 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
39. Id. at 689.
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scrutinizing legislative motivations behind overtly neutral laws.40
Washington v. Davis" is a watershed in the continuing develop-
ment of standards applicable to the inference of unconstitutional
legislative motives. In Davis, the Court ratified analysis of intent as
the true test of unconstitutionality, and thereby rejected the conten-
tion that impact could be used as the sole determinant.'2 That deci-
sion not only ended confusion as to the proper test, but also clarified
the form of the analysis; a showing of impact would shift the burden
to the state to explain the law or actions on racially neutral
grounds,'" and the "totality of the relevant facts," including impact,
became the proper standard for proving illicit intent." Aside from
the role of impact, however, Davis offered no further guidance to
later courts as to what kinds or degrees of evidence would suffice to
prove such intent. Because the facts of Davis clearly precluded a
finding of discriminatory purpose,' 5 the Court was not pressed to
elucidate an ambiguous, uncertain area.
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Devel-
opment Corp.,'" a more difficult situation forced the Court to ana-
lyze evidentiary factors in greater detail than in Davis. In Arlington
Heights, the challenger alleged that the decision of the zoning board
not to rezone certain property for use as low-income housing vio-
lated his equal protection rights because racial discrimination had
motivated the decision. After adopting the general Davis test of
intent, the Court observed that to invalidate a law it is necessary
to prove only that discrimination was a motive, rather than the
primary or dominant one.'7 The Court upheld the board's decision
by looking to specific sources of evidence which can generally be
classified as historical and circumstantial.'8 Despite the Court's at-
40. The availability of less discriminatory alternatives to achieve the legislative objective
is not a factor cited in any of these cases. Such a criterion belongs to litigation under Title
VII, wherestrict scrutiny is triggered by uneven impact. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (cited in Feeney, 99 S. Ct. at 2298 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
41. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (challenge to a test given police recruits to determine reading
and comprehension skills with allegedly illegal discriminatory impact on minorities).
42. Id. at 242; see note 29 supra.
43. 426 U.S. at 241 (quoting Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632).
44. Id. at 242.
45. Evidence that the police department had made affirmative efforts to recruit blacks,
that the test was neutral and that blacks were represented on the police force in a proportion
equivalent to the black population in the community eliminated discriminatory intent as an
issue. Id. at 237.
46. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
47. Id. at 265-66; see Brest, supra note 29, at 116-18. The Davis holding is consistent with
prior cases such as Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) where discriminatory
intent had proven a factor in the decision. Id. at 210; note 33 supra.
48. The Court listed several factors, such as the historical background of the decision,
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tempted codification of factors pertinent to an evidentiary inquiry
into intent, however, the Arlington Heights decision failed to ana-
lyze important factors such as foreseeability of result and the availa-
bility of less discriminatory alternatives.
Viewed in the context of these other equal protection cases,
Feeney clarifies the standard for the propriety and relative weight
of the evidence required to compel an inference of discriminatory
intent."5 The case does not formulate a new framework for analyzing
unconstitutional legislative motive; rather, it adopted the Davis
procedure of a threshold inquiry into intent, triggered by discrimi-
natory impact, to determine whether a closer form of scrutiny than
the rational basis test is justified.5 Faced with the hard fact that a
preference for veterans effectively denies women an opportunity to
compete for attractive civil service positions, the Court ultimately
focused on whether this unfair impact, together with other evidence
showing the historical context of the statute, the avilability of less
discriminatory alternatives and the foreseeability or inevitability of
result, compelled an inference of discriminatory intent.
The majority and dissenting opinions both invoked the histori-
cal factor, but to support conflicting inferences. Justice Stewart,
writing for the majority, claimed that the legislative history of the
statute militated against an inference of discriminatory purpose,5 1
since "the benefit of the preference was consistently offered to 'any
person' who was a veteran. ' ' 5 The dissent took the position that the
legislature necessarily intended to follow the gender-biased federal
military policy, because the statute benefited only that historically
all-male class. 3 On the basis of history alone, either interpretation
might seem plausible. Feeney thus demonstrates the weakness of
history as evidence of intent, except in cases like Griffin v. School
the sequence of events leading up to the decision, any departures from the normal procedural
sequence and contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body. Id. at 267-
68.
49. Justice Stevens correctly pointed out in his concurring opinion in Davis that each
case "may well involve differing evidentiary considerations." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 253 (1976). This does not mean that important generalizations about the type of evidence
admissible, as well as the weight of general factors, cannot be taken as precedent for similar
cases.
50. See text accompanying notes 28 & 30 supra.
51. Recourse to history to show nondiscriminatory legislative intent was also used in
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547 (1972), where steady increases in payments to certain
welfare recipients over the years undercut any inference of discriminatory intent in the legis-
lative decision to reduce the overall percentage of available funds allocated to recipients.
52. 99 S. Ct. at 2296.
53. Id. at 2298-99.
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Board, where a prior course of blatantly invidious action contra-
dicted the supposed neutrality of a statute. 5'
While Feeney deprecates the importance of history in inferring
legislative intent, the role of present discriminatory impact provides
the pivot on which the decision turns. The majority argues that the
statute is not a pretext for discrimination, because "significant
numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans-male as well
as female-are placed at a disadvantage."55 This reasoning parallels
that of another gender discrimination case, Geduldig v. Aiello."8 The
majority opinion in Geduldig, also written by Justice Stewart,
stated that a state health insurance program which denied benefits
for normal pregnancy did not discriminate against women, because
the savings accrued by the exclusion benefited not just men, but
also nonpregnant women." Taken together, Feeney and Geduldig
suggest that whenever numerous members of the sex allegedly pre-
ferred share the disadvantages, or whenever numerous members of
the sex allegedly disadvantaged share the benefits, the Court will
infer no intent to discriminate. In the Feeney context, the logic of
this position fails: because the veterans' preference handicaps some
males, it does not follow that the legislature did not intend to pre-
serve the civil service as a male sanctum at the expense of females,
given the overwhelming impact on women seeking civil service posi-
tions above the traditional secretarial and clerical levels that the
system allows them to occupy."
In any case, Feeney appears to modify the application, if not
the logic of the Geduldig analysis. The two-part test of the majority
contains a curious dichotomy in purporting first to determine
54. 377 U.S. 218 (1964); see text accompanying note 35 supra.
55. 99 S. Ct. at 2294.
56. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
57. Id. at 496 & n.20. "The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively fem-
ale, the second includes members of both sexes. The fiscal and actuarial benefits of the
program thus accrue to members of both sexes." Id.
58. In noting that women held 43% of all civil service positions, the Court conceded that
a "large unspecified percentage" of these women worked "in lower paying positions for which
males traditionally had not applied." 99 S. Ct. at 2291.
The crucial statistic, however, is that 47% of Massachusetts men over 18, but only 0.8%
of the Commonwealth women over 18, were veterans when the action commenced. Id. at 2299
n.3 (dissenting opinion). According to the stipulated facts before the district court in Anthony
v. Massachusetts only 16,000 women in Massachusetts were veterans, out of 1,990,000 women
residing in the Commonwealth; thus, 0.8% of the women were veterans. Anthony v.
Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485, 504 n.5 (1976) (dissenting opinion). The majority opinion
in Feeney declared that 1.8% of Massachusetts women were veterans, without explaining this
discrepancy from the agreed statement of facts. 99 S. Ct. at 2291. Apparently, 99.2% of
Massachusetts women face this severe handicap in obtaining significant civil service posi-
tions.
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whether the classification is a mere pretext for discrimination, then
to determine if a "discriminatory purpose has, at least in some mea-
sure, shaped the . .. legislation."" Justice Stevens, concurring,
correctly pointed out that the two approaches are analytically the
same. 0 The intermediate level of review typical of sex discrimina-
tion cases"' will be triggered regardless of whether the statute is
found to be a pretext for, or merely in some measure motivated by
an invidious intent. Significantly, whatever the rationale explaining
this dichotomy, the Court applied the Geduldig reasoning only to
determine whether the statute is a pretext, and not to decide
whether some better disguised discriminatory motive exists.
While the two-fold Feeney inquiry might seem at first to offer
a way for a challenger of a facially neutral law to pierce the statutory
mask of neutrality, the application of the second part of the test by
the Court severely blunted its effectiveness as a probe into legisla-
tive intent. For example, the Court dismissed the availability of less
discriminatory alternatives as a factor in determining intent." The
dissenter argued that the preference, "when viewed against the
range of less discriminatory alternatives available to assist veter-
ans," clearly demonstrated the required intent, because a legisla-
ture not motivated to discriminate would have chosen a means with
less severe impact.63 Justice Marshall's argument is similar to a
Title VII analysis, where the availability of less discriminatory em-
ployment practices puts the challenged practice under strict scru-
tiny, though not necessarily requiring an inference of discriminatory
intent."
The majority rejected Justice Marshall's approach. If offering
a preference to veterans necessarily implies an intent to discrimi-
nate against women, the degree of preference should make no con-
stitutional difference, since any invidious intent to discriminate,
regardless of the extent of its impact, violates the equal protection
clause. 5 Conversely, if a court finds that the statute was designed
59. 99 S. Ct. at 2294.
60. "If a classification is not overtly based on gender, I am inclined to believe the
question whether it is covertly gender-based is the same as the question whether its adverse
effects reflect invidious gender-based discrimination." Id. at 2297.
The concurring opinion also demonstrates a strict adherence to a Geduldig-like analysis,
stating that the large number of disadvantaged males is sufficient "to refute the claim that
the rule was intended to benefit males as a class over females as a class." Id.
61. See notes 28 & 30 supra.
62. 99 S. Ct. at 2295.
63. Id. at 2299.
64. See notes 29 & 40 supra.
65. 99 S. Ct. at 2295.
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not to discriminate against women but solely to aid veterans, no
degree of preference would alter the basic neutrality of the purpose
of the statute." Since the district court did find that the Massachu-
setts Legislature had acted without intent to discriminate against
women," the majority concluded that any application of this prefer-
ence, regardless of severity of impact, is constitutionally permissi-
ble.
Rather than using impact as a factor in discovering intent, the
majority seemed to reason backwards from a prior conclusion about
that intent. It is unrealistic to view a dramatic difference in impact
as not truly indicating the difference between invidious and benign
motivation, especially where analysis of other factors leaves motiva-
tion in doubt. While a state may establish a degree of preference for
veterans that discriminates somewhat more against women than
against men, this system of absolute preference that automatically
handicaps ninety-nine women out of a hundred reflects certain bias.
The Feeney majority did not provide a satisfying rationale for its
suggestion that no evidence of possible alternatives with less severe
impact is relevant in a search for discriminatory intent."
Equally baffling is the treatment by the Court of foreseeability
or inevitability of discriminatory result as a factor in inferring hid-
den intent. The concurring judge in the district court argued that
the uneven impact of the statute on men and women was so ob-
viously inevitable that the lawmakers must have intended that re-
sult to occur." The Supreme Court, while approving foreseeability
of result as a relevant factor, 0 rejected the notion that awareness or
volition by itself proves discriminatory purpose. Such purpose
"implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected or reaffirmed a par-
ticular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."'" The Court
thus distinguished between discriminatory impact as an obvious
cost which is incurred to achieve a desired end and legislation where
the discriminatory effect is an end in itself. At first glance, this
analysis appears consistent with the weight given to the foreseeabil-
66. Id. n.23.
67. Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. at 156.
68. 99 S. Ct. at 2295 n.23. The Court may have been aware of the weakness of the
argument. Under the equal protection clause, the judiciary must distinguish between permis-
sible and impermissible policies. By granting such deference to legislative choices of ostensi-
bly neutral policies which have severe discriminatory impact, the Court in effect abdicated
its equal protection responsibilities.
69. 451 F. Supp. at 151.
70. 99 S. Ct. at 2296 n.25.
71. Id. at 2296.
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ity factor in prior cases. Although a foreseeable result was important
in the Goss case,72 for instance, inevitability of result was only deci-
sive when seen in the light of other evidence, such as a history of
opposition to integration.7" The Feeney majority although purport-
ing to reaffirm foreseeability as a relevant factor in inferring illegal
purpose, thus eviscerated the practical significance of that factor by
carving away the importance of other evidence, especially the over-
whelming discriminatory impact on women.
Accordingly, the defense of the statutory classification by the
majority as not "inherently non-neutral"' failed to recognize that
the "class" of nonveterans really consists of two classes, male non-
veterans and female nonveterans, not similarly situated for pur-
poses of an equal protection analysis. First, because women nonvet-
erans constitute virtually the entire female population75 while only
about half the men are nonveterans, the difference in the degree of
harm to women as a class compared to the harm to all men as a class
is so great as to belie any inference of neutrality. Second, restric-
tions on women's opportunities to enlist in the armed forces place
women at a further disadvantage.7" Facing fewer restrictions, most
male nonveterans simply choose not to enlist. Facing a pre-1968
quota of two percent of enlisted personnel in the armed services,
among other restrictions, women nonveterans have not had the
same choice. The draft likewise excludes women. Few women obtain
veteran's status, then, because of discriminatory federal military
policies. To claim that the statute is gender-neutral because the
disadvantaged class consists of both men and women is to mask the
dramatic differences in treatment of men as a class and women as
a class beneath the superficially neutral division between veterans
and nonveterans. The legislature could have completely avoided
this foreseeable result by making the absolute preference system
genuinely gender-neutral: granting an absolute preference to male
veterans over male nonveterans only, and to female veterans over
female nonveterans only. This option would have avoided the entire
argument about degrees of invidious discrimination, and demon-
strates that in maximizing benefits for veterans beyond what a truly
72. 373 U.S. 683 (1963); see text accompanying note 38 supra.
73. 373 U.S. 686-87.
74. 99 S. Ct. at 2294-95.
75. See note 58 supra.
76. Until 1967, women were prohibited from making up more than two percent of all
enlisted personnel in the armed forces. 99 S. Ct. at 2291 n.2 1 (majority opinion); id. at 2298
n.1 (dissenting opinion); Anthony, 415 F. Supp. at 489. Further restrictions on entrance have
been placed on women in the past, and women are still ineligible for the draft. 415 F. Supp.
at 489-90.
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gender-neutral framework would provide, the legislature must have
consciously chosen to discriminate against ninety-nine percent of
the Commonwealth's women.
In conclusion, the importance of Feeney lies in its delineation
of the evidentiary standards applied to compel an inference of dis-
criminatory intent behind facially neutral laws. The use of history
by the Court affirms its validity as a criterion, but also demon-
strates its inconclusiveness. Similarly, Feeney severely limits the
challenger's options by rejecting evidence of less discriminatory al-
ternatives as a factor in inferring intent. In addition, the require-
ment that foreseeability of result prove discrimination as a positive
goal of the statute negates the practical importance of foreseeability
as an aid in determining intent. With this conservative definition
of the evidence required to compel an inference of discriminatory
intent, the Court has practically guaranteed that no equal protec-
tion challenge to a facially gender-neutral law will ever succeed
unless the invidious legislative intent is express and unequivocal.
Even viewed in the light of the Geduldig decision, Feeney is not
necessarily part of a trend "to return men and women to a time
when 'traditional' equal protection analysis sustained legislative
classifications that treated differently members of a particular sex
solely because of their sex."" But Feeney does indicate a trend
toward judicial passivity in the area of equal protection challenges
generally. There are no guidelines in the Constitution, federal stat-
utes or developed case law as to when a court must infer invidious
intent behind a neutral law. Equal protection challenges to facially
neutral laws fall into the relatively undeveloped area between Title
VII and overt gender classifications. Left largely to its own discre-
tion, the treatment of the evidentiary burden by the Court reflects
more a policy decision than an interpretation of the law. The policy
embodied in Feeney is that where neutral laws create discriminatory
effects, the blame as well as the remedy lies in the political rather
than the judicial sphere; "the Fourteenth Amendment 'cannot be
made a refuge from ill-advised . . .laws.' ,,
RICHARD A. WARREN
77. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 503 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 99 S. Ct. at 2297 (quoting District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 150 (1909)).
Dandridge v. Williams provides a typical expression of this deference to state policy choices:
We do not decide today that [the state's] regulation is wise, that it best
fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [the state] might ideally
espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting
claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of
almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable
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